**Introduction**

Extant research on gender and politics converges on the idea that a quota system promotes women's representation (citation). The impact of gender quota has been observed across various electoral systems (citation), with substantial findings highlighting the superiority of proportional representation (PR) systems in boosting women’s electoral success. A quota indeed functions differently across countries, with some seeing rapid expansions in women’s representation upon adoption, and others experience only negligible effects (citation). This does not suggest that quotas are ineffective. Rather, their success often depends on other institutional factors such as placement mandates, enforcement mechanisms, and voluntary party commitment (citation). The positive effects of quotas in democracies are well-documented, and recent studies have also identified beneficial outcomes in autocratic settings, showing how specific gender allocations gain support from both regime loyalists and opponents (Noh et al., 2024).

While most research treats quotas as a macro-level policy focused on national legislature implementation, there is a notable gap in understanding how quotas function at the subnational level. As Clayton (2021: 237) highlights, the inconsistent reporting of quota enforcement in subnational contexts makes it challenging to evaluate their effectiveness. This paper addresses this gap by examining quota application at the provincial level in Indonesia’s 2024 elections. I specifically investigate the causal link between quota implementation and the share of elected women in local legislatures. Specifically, I emphasize the varied 'compliance effect' among political parties and employ a design-based approach that pairs quota-compliant parties with non-compliant ones that have similar observed characteristics. This matching technique enables me to isolate factors known to significantly influence women’s electoral success. In the Indonesian context, these include the impacts of party size, candidate ballot position, gender, and district magnitude. Conditional on all relevant characteristics being observed and the comparisons between treated (compliant) and untreated (non-compliant) units being well-balanced, this approach allows us to make a compelling case for the importance and effectiveness of quotas in enhancing female representation.

Unlike previous works that tend to. Provided that all important

GW BERARTI BUKAN PSM karen aga pake probability lagi karena udah jelas siapa yang comply dan siapa yang bukan.

What is less known ada confounding

* More recent works started to explicitly employ experimental technique or reasoning with different goals, varying from assessing the impact of quota on the share of women in candidate list (Bagues and Campa 2021), the impact on gendered performance evaluations (Neschen and Hügelschäfer 2021) interactive effect with list positions and gender (Devroe 2019), to assessing its influence on broader women voter’s political engagement (Clayton 2015) Few exceptions on this studies are Karpowitz et al. (2017) who.
* Second, subnational analysis kurang (Clayton)
* I focus on a design based, instead of statistical modelling.
* I exploit the changin rule of quota by Indonesian KPU
* Method and technique
* My findings are
* The small effect of Islam
* This speaks to

**Alternative explanations**: Logit Regression Small parties and big parties (10 percent)

One benefit of using PSM is that the assumption of random assignment to the treatment variable can be relaxed (why only traditional PSM? mereka bukan pake PSM tapi matching lain, quote baca Giancarlo PSRM and Rosenbaum 1998 2002). This is because PSM relies more on balancing covariates between the control and treated groups, assuming that unobserved variables are appropriately accounted for. Tambah dua kalimat terkait ini. However, one might argue that the treatment assignment regarding quota compliance among parties still suffers from key unobserved confounders. For example, parties may differ in their attitudes toward the changing quota rules and may view these changes as a strategy to gain more support from electorates. In the months leading up to the election, public vehemently opposed the rule, and leading civil society organizations took the KPU's decision to the Indonesian Supreme Court, which ultimately ruled that the KPU had violated the law and that the gender quota must be restored to a minimum of 30 percent (quote). But the KPU ignored the Supreme Court's decision, resulting in the number of female candidates depending on the party's decision – without any repercussions for non-compliance. It is thus logical to claim that compliance to the new quota ruling can be endogenous to the divergent response between parties, given each party can behave differently with the expectation for grabbing more votes.

Since Indonesia established the 4 percent threshold for party in the national parliament, small party will reasonably need more votes to secure their seats. They are thus likely to be more responsive to comply with the new quota as to signal stronger commitment about women representation. Following the results from the previous section, we will expect for smaller party to place more women in generally more advantageous ballot list relative to big parties. I follow Mainwaring’s (2018: 38) classification of big party as a ‘significant contender’ as one that earned minimum 10 percent of the vote from the last election and treat those with less than 10 percent as smaller ones. I code ‘1’ if party is big and ‘0’ for small. I ran three different logit models with a robust standard error and district fixed effect to account for unobserved differences across district, while putting the same slate of variables as in the previous models. (jelaskan apa aja unobserved differencenya). Recall that the endogeneity concern will be confirmed if the direction of coefficient is negative (directing toward small parties), and quota compliance is significantly explain the difference between the size of the parties.

Table XX shows that the null findings for the treatment remain the same. The distinction between major and small parties cannot be explained by the adherence to quota rule. Model 1 demonstrates the independent influence of the treatment with district fixed effect, and we found no statistical results to support our skepticism. The second model adds up our control variables. While there might be no theoretical validations to explain the relationships between control variables and the party size, our main concern is how the treatment coefficient can be affected when other indicators are added. And we continue to observe the absence of treatment effect in the model. Lastly, I remove the fixed effect in model 3 and employed a robust standard error and the results hold up to defy our empirical expectation.

The second possible endogeneity is that ideological difference can affect quota compliance among party. Extant works argue that Indonesian party run out of meaningful ideological distinction and clientelism and vote-buying dianggap sebagai fenomena umum dalam politik (quote 3). Other works explain the revival of ideological importance, noting particularly Islamic ideology as the ordering force that structures party rivalry (quota 3). In gender and politics literature, the ‘cultural barrier’ debates have evolved from early claim that argue certain values infused by Islamic conservatism may inhibit women when pursuing public office (quota 2) to a more contemporary works that emphasize its diminishing effects (quote). Analyzing the patterns of candidates nomination in Indonesia’s 2019 election, Prihatini (2020) found that Islamic and non-Islamic parties have no difference when it comes to achieving the minimum quota percentage. But they both did poorly when it comes to placing female candidate on the upper list ballot. A recent work from White et al. (2024) indicates that being Indonesian Muslim is associated with a higher patriarchal attitude and less support for a higher quota for women.

Armed with these insights, I test the idea that the level compliance to a new quota ruling can be explained by variations of party ideology. We expect Islamic parties to be less supportive toward women candidate and in general will have less compliance than non-Islamic parties. Since classification of Islamic parties in Indonesia is a contested notion and scholars differ in defining what constitute as Islamic party (see Baswedan; Mujani; Okthariza ), I differentiate between ‘Islam inclusive’ and ‘Islam exclusive’ parties. The former refers to any party that either place Islamic value in their party platforms, having Islamic appeals, or conventionally regarded as having traditional Muslim voters as their main constituencies (these include PKS, Ummat, PPP, PBB, PAN, PKB, and Gelora), whilst for the later I apply a more restrictive definition, that is, party with an explicit recognition of Islam written in their party platform (restricted to PKS, Ummat, PPP, and PBB). A slate of similar control variables and binary coding rule ‘1’ for Islamic party and ‘0’ otherwise applied.

Table XX confirms our first empirical expectation. When the whole Islamic parties are considered, the result for quota compliance is negative and statistically significant at 1 percent level. This indicates that Islamic parties overall tend to comply less than non-Islamic parties. The same relationship can be found when other indicators are included. Interestingly, when the analysis is restricted to all more conservative Islamic parties, the direction of coefficient becomes positive and much stronger in magnitude (p-value is less than 1 percent level) than model 1 and 2. This suggests that the level of conservatism within Islamic parties may play a decisive role in determining their stance towards quota compliance. The negative results that we found in the previous models were likely due to the moderate Islamic parties drive drown the coefficient as they have less compliance toward new quota rule. The conclusion to be drawn from this rather surprising result is that quota compliance is strongest among the most conservative parties in Indonesia. This run counter to the broader ‘cultural barrier’ literature and warrants more systematic examinations in future research.

**Conclusion**

